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ABSTRACT
This paper challenges a fundamental assumption of corporate law
scholarship. Corporate law is heavily influenced by economics, and by
normative economics in particular. Economic efficiency, for example, is seen
as the primary goal of good corporate governance. But this dependence on
standard notions of economic efficiency is unfortunate, as those notions are
highly problematic. In economic theory, efficiency is spelled out in terms of
individual preference satisfaction, which is an inadequate foundation for any
sort of normative analysis. We argue that on any account of the good, people
will sometimes prefer things that aren't good for them on that account. Giving
people what they want, then, isn't necessarily an accomplishment, and thus
the normative assessment of economic outcomes is much more complicated
than economists recognize. This fact is something that should be reflected in
corporate law scholarship, and would greatly expand the range of possible
considerations when restructuring corporate law.
INTRODUCTION
THE standard view in corporate law holds 
that corporations are organized
to maximize shareholder wealth. This focus is supposed to be
economically efficient in the sense that no alternative arrangement can better
satisfy any corporate stakeholder without satisfying another stakeholder to a
lesser extent. This efficiency claim has both a descriptive and a normative
dimension: focus on shareholder wealth maximization (subject to the business
judgment rule) is the corporate standard because of pressures to satisfy
stakeholder wishes; it is also supposed to be a good thing precisely because it
improves the satisfaction of some stakeholders' desires without diminishing
the satisfaction of others.
The normative argument here is problematic. Economic efficiency is
ultimately a matter of how preference satisfaction is distributed. Preference
satisfaction, however, is a deficient foundation for moral claims: giving people
what they want isn't necessarily a good thing. This is not merely the result of
particular judgments based on traditional moral views. On any account of the
good, people will sometimes want things that aren't good for them on that
account. Economic efficiency looks at the wrong sort of thing for a normative
view. Given this problem, the moral foundation of corporate law is
undermined.
This Article proceeds in three stages. The first Part reviews some of the
basic notions of economic efficiency, from Pareto optimality to the more
forgiving Kaldor-Hicks version. The second Part examines how corporate
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scholars of almost every variety have reflexively relied upon standard notions
of efficiency to provide the normative underpinnings for their particular
visions of corporate governance. The third Part, comprising the bulk of the
essay, argues that efficiency is normatively irrelevant and, as such, is not a
proper basis for evaluating the structures of corporate governance. This
conclusion undercuts many of the arguments against corporate reform,
opening the debate over corporate governance to a much wider, and
ultimately more illuminating, array of considerations.
I. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY - A QUICK REVIEW
When economists discuss efficiency, they are typically referring to Pareto
optimality, also known as Pareto effideng or allocative effideng. To understand
Pareto optimality, one must first understand the notion of a Pareto improvement.
A situation x is a Pareto improvement over a situationy just in case no one
(strictly) prefers y to x and at least one person (strictly) prefers x to y.' The
definition of a Pareto improvement is sometimes put in terms of utility: x is a
Pareto improvement overy just in case the utility of x is at least as great as the
utility ofy for everyone and the utility of x is greater than the utility ofy for at
least one person.2 Since utility, in the sense intended, is simply a numerical
index of individual preference satisfaction, the two accounts are equivalent 3
either way, Pareto improvements are defined in terms of preference
satisfaction. A situation is Pareto optimal just in case no other situation is a
Pareto improvement over it.4 If, for example, Z is a Pareto optimal situation,
and someone (strictly) prefers x to Z then there must be someone else who
prefers Z to x. In other words, if a situation is Pareto optimal and someone
wants to change it, then either someone else opposes the change or you
weren't at a Pareto optimal situation to begin with. A Pareto optimal situation
is often thought to be desirable because it is the end result of a series of
Pareto improvements, which are thought to be good. In other words, Pareto
optimality is valued because it implies that as much uncontested (and thus
1. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, MORAL
PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 65 (2d ed. 2006). On the standard terminology, this is
a weak Pareto improvement; x is a strng Pareto improvement over y if and only if
everyone (strictly) prefers x to y. We frame the discussion in terms of weak Pareto
improvements, but the arguments apply to strong Pareto improvements too, mutatis
mutandis.
2. See, e.g., YEW-KWANG NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS: INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF BASIC CONCEPTS 30 (1979).
3. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 53-54.
4. Id. at 65.
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uncontroversial) preference satisfaction has been achieved as possible from a
given starting point.
The uncontested nature of Pareto improvements is what makes them so
appealing to economists. So long as a given situation is a Pareto
improvement over what preceded it, one never has to balance one person's
gains in satisfaction with another's losses (since, by definition, nobody prefers
the former situation and hence nobody loses satisfaction). This allows
economists to avoid making interpersonal utility comparisons, which are
thought to be fraught with difficulties.5  The main difficulty with such
comparisons is that there is no objective scale upon which to compare the
level of preference satisfaction of two different people. 6 As Lionel Robbins
recognized in the early 1930s:
There is no means of testing the magnitude of A's satisfaction as compared
with B's. If we tested the state of their blood-streams, that would
be a test of blood, not satisfaction. Introspection does not
enable A to measure what is going on in B's mind, nor B to
measure what is going on in A's. There is no way of comparing
the satisfactions of different people.7
Economists, seeking to ground their claims on neutral empirical evidence,
thus limited themselves to measuring the desirability of various situations in
terms of Pareto improvements and Pareto optimality.8
Dodging the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, however,
comes at a price-economists are left with a relatively stripped-down metric.
People and institutions are rarely in situations where, all things considered,
they are in position to make a decision that produces a Pareto
improvement-more frequently, there are winners and losers. It is also far
from clear that anyone would want to li-it policymakers to decisions that
produced Pareto improvements. As Amartya Sen pointed out:
5. See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL
IMPORTANCE 113-20 (1986); Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibiity of Intepersonal Utiity
Compansons, 104 MIND 473, 475-77 (1995); Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One
Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REv. 213, 236-47 (2003). A brief discussion of the concept
of utility and its relationship to welfare may be found in Alfred F. MacKay, Extended
Sympathy and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 83 J. PHIL. 305, 305-07 (1986).
6. See Hayden, supra note 5, at 244-47.
7. LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
139-40 (2d ed. 1937).
8. See Hayden, supra note 5, at 238; Peter J. Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Uti4ty: Why
and How They Are and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING
200, 206 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991).
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An economy can be optimal in this sense even when some
people are rolling in luxury and others are near starvation as long
as the starvers cannot be made better off without cutting into the
pleasures of the rich. If preventing the burning of Rome would
have made Emperor Nero feel worse off, then letting him burn
Rome would have been Pareto-optimal. In short, a society or an
economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting.9
Thus, Pareto measures, at best, incompletely capture most decision-
making situations and may even counsel against some very good options
(extinguishing the fires of Rome, for example). They have, in other words,
both descriptive and normative shortcomings.
Economists have responded to these shortcomings by relying upon
another, related measure of efficiency-Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 0 A situation
x is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement over situation p just in case the winners
under x could compensate the losers such that, after compensation, nobody
would prefery to x and at least one person would prefer x toy." In other
words, states of affairs are Kaldor-Hicks efficient just in case they would be
Pareto improvements if compensation were actually paid.12 For this reason,
some have called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency a "potential Pareto" criterion. 3
Using Kaldor--Iicks efficiency has helped economists get around the fact
that the Pareto criterion has little to offer in analyzing most situations, where
the realistic options produce both winners and losers. This enables them to
get some work done while maintaining the fiction that they are doing so in a
"neutral" way. It is a fiction, of course, because the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is
useful only because it reintroduces interpersonal utility comparisons and their
messy, unfounded value judgments.14 That said, many economists, and the
corporate law theorists who follow them, spin their theories praying for
Pareto efficiency and settling for Kaldor-Hicks. At any rate, Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency is concerned with utility, which is to say preference satisfaction. If
we are right about the inadequacy of preference satisfaction based normative
claims, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency falls along with Pareto efficiency.
9. AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 22 (1970).
10. See Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Wefare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1517 (2003). For more
on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see generally JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE
LAw 81-86, 98-100, 104-05, 116-17 (1988).
11. See Coleman (2003), supra note 10, at 1517.
12. See, COLEMAN (1988), supra note 10, at 84. Of course, actual compensation need not be
paid. See id.
13. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 85-86 (1978); see also
HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 65.
14. See Coleman (2003), supra note 10, at 1517.
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Preference-based claims of efficiency play both a descriptive and
normative role in economic theory. Economists appeal to Pareto optimality
in order to describe the outcomes that result from (or are at least approached
by) certain economic interactions; they also see such efficient outcomes as
desirable. Economists focus on these outcomes precisely because they see
them as good.5 The descriptive account that features efficiency claims holds
that, absent constraints, people will engage in voluntary trading in order to
achieve their goals. Under certain (not-wholly-implausible) conditions,
voluntary transactions are Pareto improvements. In order for a trade to
happen, for example, at least one participant must (strictly) prefer it and no
participant will prefer that it not happen; further, most third parties are likely
to be indifferent.16 Voluntary transactions will proceed until no one wants to
trade anymore, resulting in a Pareto optimal situation. This is the core of the
argument that perfectly competitive markets are efficient' 7
The normative role of Pareto efficiency is even easier to see. Almost all
economists accept some version of the Pareto principle, which holds, roughly,
that if a situation x is a Pareto improvement over a situationp then x is better
thanj.18 The argument for the Pareto principle involves two key principles.
15. Paul T. Heyne, Moral Misunderstanding and the Justification of Markets, THE REGION (Dec.
1998), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications-papers/pub-display
.cfm?id= 3583.
16. This assumes that the preferences of people who aren't part of the transaction aren't
"entangled" with those of traders. While this is generally false (for example, repugnant
markets, envy, altruism, etc.), it is at least plausible for many interactions among strangers.
17. Perfect competition involves a set of conditions that are sufficient to guarantee that
voluntary transactions are Pareto improvements.
18. See, e.g., HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 136; AMARTYA K. SEN, ETHICS &
ECONOMICS: THE MORAL STANDING OF THE MARKET 10 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds.,
1985); Bertil Tungodden, The Value ofEqualit, 19 ECON. & PHIL. 1, 19 (2003); Howard F.
Chang, A Liberal Theory of Sodal Welfare: Fairness, Utilit, and the Pareto Princile, 110 YALE
L.J. 173, 175-80 (2000); Martin Feldstein, Reducin Povery, Not Inequality, 139 PUB.
INTEREST 33, 34 (1999); Nicolas Gravel, On the Dificult of Combinin Actual and Potential
Criteria for an Increase in Sodal Welfare, 17 ECON. THEORY 163, 164 (2001); Nicholas
Rescher, Economics vs. Moral Philosophy: The Pareto Princzyle as a Case Studj of their Divergent
Orientation, 10 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1985); THEORY & DECISION 169, 170 (1979);
Amartya K. Sen, Ijbery, Unanimly and Rights, 43 Economica 217, 217 (1976); Arnartya K.
Sen, Personal Utilities and Public Judgments: Or What's Wrong with We/fare Economics, 89 ECoN.
J. 537, 537 (1979); Robert Sugden & Albert Weale, A Contractual Reformulation of Certain
Aspects of Welfare Economics, 46 ECONOMICA 111, 111 (1979). On the standard
terminology, this is a version of the strong Pareto principle since it appeals to weak Pareto
improvements. The strong Pareto principles involves weak Pareto improvements; the
weak Pareto principle involves strong Pareto improvements, i.e., if everyone prefers x toy
then x is better thanj. See, e.g., Nicolas Gravel, On the Dificulty of Combining Actual and
Potential Citeria for an Increase in Social Welfare. 17 EcoN. THEORY 163, 164 (2001).
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Unambiguous Welfare Gain ("UWG"): The existence of a Pareto
improvement implies that there is welfare gain for someone without a
decrease in anyone's welfare.
Minimal Benevolence ("MB"): It is (morally) good to increase welfare, other
things equal.'9
UWG holds that preference satisfaction is connected with well-being; MB
ties well-being to morality. If both principles hold true, then Pareto
improvements increase welfare and increasing welfare is good, ceterispaibus.20
This argument involves a dual appeal to dominance reasoning-that if
something is better along one set of dimensions and no worse along any
other, then it must be better with respect to those dimensions all together. If
x is a Pareto improvement over y, x is supposed to be better than y with
respect to one facet of the good-welfare-because it improves the well-
being of at least one person and leaves no one worse off. Further, if other
non-welfare values are the same, then x is better than y simpliciter. A number
of thinkers are leery of the Pareto principle on the grounds that moral analysis
goes beyond issues of well-being. They allow, for example, that x might be a
Pareto improvement overy and still be worse thany because well-being is not
the only morally relevant issue in evaluating x andy.21 They usually conclude
that Pareto improvements are still morally appealing because, even if
particular Pareto improvements are not, on balance, good, Pareto
improvements are moral improvements, other things equal.2 Even on this
account, every inefficient outcome is worse with respect to welfare than any
Pareto improvement over it. The maximum amount of welfare obtainable is
reached by some Pareto optimal outcome. This allows, of course, for non-
welfare distinctions among Pareto efficient outcomes, but it is often thought
that being Pareto optimal is a necessary condition for something to be a best
outcome.
19. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 65.
20. See, e.g., HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 64-65; Botond Koszegi & Matthew
Rabin, Choices, Situations, and Happiness, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1821, 1821-23 (2008); S. Gloria-
Palermo & G. Palermo, Austrian Economics and Value judgments: A Critical Comparison aith
Neoclassical Economics, 17 REV. POL. ECON. 63, 66-67 (2005); Anne E. Cudd, Is Pareto
Optimality a CriterionforJustice?, 22 Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 1, 1, 28-29 (1996).
21. See, e.g., HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 65-67; SEN (1985), supra note 18; Ian
B. Lee, Eficieng and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primag, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533,
579 (2006); Sen (1976), supra note 18, at 220, 226, 235; Robert Sugden, Is Fairness Good? A
Critique of Varian's Theory of Fairness, 18 Nous 505, 505 (1984).
22. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 138; SEN (1985), supra note 18, at 10;
Chang, supra note 18, at 177, 196.
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II. EFFICIENCY IS CENTRAL TO CORPORATE LAW
The study of corporate governance is concerned with control over
corporate decision-making: it investigates who has such control, the extent of
that control, and the purpose that the control serves. These questions raise
important issues about both the ontology and teleology of corporations.
There seems to be considerable debate, for example, about what corporations
actually are: artificial persons, entities (partially abstract) that can be owned, or
sets of interconnected contracts. 23 There is, however, general agreement
about certain features of corporate control. Virtually everyone agrees that
shareholders have relatively little direct control over corporate policy.24
Shareholders do, however, have the right to receive residual profits as well as
the right to elect the board of directors. The directors are, in turn, the locus
of authority within the corporation-they are the representatives of the firm
when human counterparts to the fictional form are required.25 The board,
however, does not generally run the business-directors generally delegate
this power to the officers of the corporation, who have day-to-day control
over a firm's decision-making. It is one of the stylized facts about corporate
governance that this corporate structure separates ownership from control.26
And it seems to be a condition on the adequacy of any theory of the
corporation that it accounts for these principal features of corporate
governance.27
There is also considerable agreement about not only the proximate goal at
which corporate decision-making aims-shareholder wealth maximization-
but also the further end served by focusing on this goal-allocative
23. See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 17, 23-30 (2008); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 11-12, 37, 67-68 (1991); Milton Friedman,
The Social Responsibiliy of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at
32-33, 122-26.
24. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 4-6, 19-20; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at
1,4-6.
25. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 21 (1986).
26. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 4. See generally, ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 277 (1932), whose
discussion of the separation of ownership and control has arguably led to much of the
later work in the field. Cf Edward B. Rock & Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Coporaion, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619, 1624 (2001) ("It was
as if everyone already knew (from Berle and Means) that the master problem of corporate
law was agency costs, and along came an economic model and a vocabulary to elaborate
that view.").
27. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 3; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at vii.
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efficiency.28  As we will see, while theorists disagree about how the
relationships among corporate stakeholders lead to Pareto improvements,
they generally agree that they do lead to such improvements. As is usually the
case where economic reasoning is involved, this kind of appeal to efficiency
plays both descriptive and normative roles: the focus on shareholder wealth is
both explained and justified as the result of Pareto improving transactions. 29
On the traditional account of the corporation, shareholders own the
firm. 30 Managing operations through anything like ownership consensus,
however, is exceedingly difficult because shareholders have different
perspectives, degrees of interest, and levels of expertise. Given this difficulty,
shareholders find it advantageous to their interests to hire a manager, and
often to set up a management hierarchy. Such a course achieves both the
lower transaction costs of unified decision-making and the higher outputs of
having the firm controlled by someone with special expertise.31 The
(expected) increased profits make it at least possible for the corporation to offer
more attractive deals to other stakeholders, so no one should lose utility.32
The shareholder-ownership/management-control account involves a
classical principle-agent situation-the owners relinquish control for the
benefits of expertise and unitary decision-making. As an employee of the
shareholders, a manager has a duty to look out for their interests. 33 There are
no advantages to be gained, however, unless the shareholders actually
relinquish control and the managers actually exercise it. This relationship is
set forth in the business judgment rule.34
There are drawbacks to any such arrangement, of course. A
manager/agent will not have exactly the same incentives as her
shareholders/principals. She might, therefore, be tempted to cheat, or at least
give less than her full effort.35 The oversight provided by assigning her a
fiduciary duty tends to ameliorate such problems, as does the market for
28. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 32-33, 35, 57-59, 65-72; EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, sura note 23, at vii, 67-68, 93; Lee, supra note 21, at 535-39.
29. See BAINBRIDGE, sura note 23, at ix-xii; EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note 23, at
Vii-Viii.
30. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 6-7, 32-33; Friedman, supra note 23, at 33.
31. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 4-6, 37-45; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at
8-10; Friedman, supra note 23, at 122.
32. See Lee, supra note 21, at 537-38.
33. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 33.
34. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 106-14; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 93-
100; Lee, supra note 21, at 551-52.
35. See BAINBRIDGE, sura note 23, at 73-74; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 91.
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corporate control and her concern for her own reputation, but too much
direct monitoring undermines the point of the arrangement.36
Does this imply that there is an inefficiency built into the usual corporate
structure? No, or at least not an allocative inefficiency. A corporation would
achieve greater profits if managers had the same interests as shareholders; in
that sense, the corporation isn't achieving as much as it could. Allocative
efficiency is concerned, however, with the preferences of agents: in general, a
manager won't want to act exactly as shareholders would have her; to
incentivize her to do so, shareholders would need to monitor her in a way
they would rather not. Dividing ownership from control is a compromise
from the perspective of both shareholders and managers, but it is also a
Pareto improvement over shareholder control.
A more recent account of corporate governance holds that a corporation
is best understood as set of voluntary, intersecting agreements, i.e., as a nexus
of contracts. 37 Given that this model is based on a series of contracts, and
each of those contracts is posited to involve a Pareto improvement (for all
parties consenting to a contract prefer the state of affairs under the contract),
it should come as no surprise that the resulting corporation is viewed to have
a strong basis in efficiency. Once this underlying story is in place, the details
take care of themselves. On this account, corporations have unified control
for exactly the same reasons as on the more traditional view: all contracting
parties prefer unified decision-making by experts. The distribution of
corporate proceeds to various stakeholders is also supposed to be efficient.
Shareholders, in particular, as the residual claimants, are assigned what is left
after all fixed claims on corporate proceeds have been paid.38 Managers and
directors are assigned, by contract or statute, a fiduciary duty to shareholders
in order to make the residual attractive.39 Total proceeds are supposed to be
higher if the residual claims are assigned to one group.40 Shareholders get the
nod over other stakeholders in lieu of contractual claims because that is the
best way to induce them to put their money at risk while also relinquishing
any real control over how it is used. 41 Again, the result is a combination of
36. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 75, 100-04, 112-13; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 23, at 91-93, 217-18.
37. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 17, 23-24, 28-30, 33-37, 43-47; EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 12, 14, 90-91.
38. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 57-59, 65-72; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, sura note 22,
at 30, 67-68.
39. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 68, 71-72; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at
90-93.
40. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 66-67; EASTERBROOK & FIscHEmL, supra note 22, at 38.
41. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 67-72; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 36-
37.
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managerial control (as expressed by the business judgment rule) and
shareholder interest (expressed by charging the managers with maximizing
shareholder wealth) that is supposed to be a Pareto improvement over both
shareholder control and a system that tries to promote all stakeholder
interests.
Not all legal scholars are advocates of shareholder wealth maximization.
Most, however, seem to accept that it is, as a descriptive matter, the primary
goal of most corporations.42 Some who argue that shareholder wealth
maximization isn't an appropriate goal do so on efficiency grounds. 43
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, for example, believe that the board should
directly advance the interests of all corporate constituents, and needs to be
somewhat insulated in order to do that (as to avoid domination, at a
minimum, by shareholder interests).44 The interests of the corporation, in
their view, "can be understood as a joint welfare function of all the individuals
who make firm-specific investments and agree to participate in the
extracontractual, internal mediation process within the firm." 45 The directors,
as mediating hierarchs in this system, make decisions in order to maximize
preference satisfaction of all stakeholders (according to the joint "welfare"
function) and so to increase allocative efficiency (at least in the Kaldor-Hicks
sense).
Indeed, efficiency is regarded with such reverence that even those who
criticize shareholder wealth maximization for non-efficiency (e.g., moral)
reasons still allow that efficiency is an important consideration. Susan Stabile,
for example, believes that the economic interests of a corporation should be
subordinated to the promotion of human dignity.46 Her particular vision is
grounded Catholic social thought, which "emphatically rejects the idea that
social welfare is merely a question of giving people what they want without
regard to what it is that people want."47 That said, Stabile doesn't wholly
abandon economic efficiency as a normative goal; instead she limits her
criticism to the "exclusive" focus on shareholder wealth maximization, noting
that profit remains a "legitimate" corporate pursuit.48
42. See Lee, supra note 21, at 535, 537-39 (2006).
43. See generall Lee, supra note 21, for a discussion of Blair's and Stout's team production
account for and Elhauge's argument for profit-sacrificing discretion.
44. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theog of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REv. 247, 288-89 (1999).
45. Id. at 288.
46. See Susan J. Stabile, The Catholic Vision of the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 181, 186
(2005).
47. Id. at 189.
48. See id. at 190-91.
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III. EFFICIENCY AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
A. Some Existing Criticisms of Efficiency
Over the years, this single-minded focus on efficiency has attracted a fair
amount of criticism. Scholars have taken aim at everything from its cramped
view of the content of peoples' preferences to its overreliance on revealed
preferences to its disdainful exclusion of other considerations (such as
fairness). We briefly catalogue some of the main criticisms in order to
distinguish the argument made in this paper.
One set of criticisms is that standard economics, and hence corporate law
scholarship, paints an incomplete picture of the content of people's interests
and preferences. Standard economics imagines people as self-interested utility
maximizers and sometimes, more specifically, wealth maximizers. 49  This
certainly underpins much of the economic reasoning in corporate law-many
scholars, for example, assume that shareholders have a single-minded interest
in profit maximization and build their theories of corporate governance
accordingly.50 There is little room in standard economics for people who are
concerned about fairness, justice, and similar "other-regarding" outcomes.
But real people, the critics maintain, are not and should not be like this.
Real people want all sorts of things, including outcomes that appeal to their
conceptions of fairness or justice.5l Even the archetypes of Homo economicus-
shareholders-are interested in more than just increasing the monetary value
of their shares. 52 The economics underlying corporate theory, to the extent it
says differently, is both descriptively inaccurate and normatively bankrupt.
Economists have a ready answer to this criticism. Utility is just a
mathematical representation of preferences, and it ultimately reflects a
person's desires.53 To the extent people desire states of affairs that promote
something beyond their narrow, financial self-interest, those desires get built
49. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Cult ofEfficieng, 71 TEx. L. REV. 217, 228 (1992).
50. The assumption that shareholders have relatively homogeneous preferences with respect
to wealth maximization is important to many theories of corporate governance. See Grant
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder
Homogeneity, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 445, 448 (2008); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T.
Bodie, Shareholder Democray and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primag, WM. & MARY L. REV.
2071, 2085 (2010); Mitchell, supra note 49, at 229.
51. See Grant Hayden & Stephen Ellis, Law andEconomicsAfter Behavioral Economics, 55 KAN. L.
REV. 629, 640 (2007); Mitchell, supra note 49, at 229.
52. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV.
561, 578 (2006) (cataloguing the ways in which shareholder interests diverge); Hayden &
Bodie, One Share, One Vote, supra note 50, at 500 (same).
53. See Hayden & Ellis, supra note 51, at 640.
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back into their utility functionS.54 (As Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell put
it, people may have a "taste" for fairness that is reflected in their
preferences.)5 5 This response, while no doubt true, does undercut some of
the claims made by corporate theorists on the basis of shareholder preference
homogeneity. More importantly for our purposes, though, this move by
economists to capture a broader range of human desires does little to take
them outside of people's preferences. If anything, it solidifies the role of
preference satisfaction in descriptive accounts and, indirectly, the sanctity of
preference satisfaction in normative accounts.
A second set of criticisms of efficiency take aim at the source of
information about people's preferences. In order to discern the content of
preferences, most economists rely exclusively upon people's actual choices.
Indeed, the choices themselves are identified as "revealed" preferences. 56
This reliance upon observable behavior, much like the use of Pareto efficiency
to begin with, is supposed to take the guesswork out of preference
assessment.57 The claim that people choose what they prefer is treated as a
virtual tautology, so choice gives us all of the information we could want
about preferences.
This account has been questioned in a number of ways. Initially,
economists are criticized for ignoring other sources of information about
preferences. One may deduce preferences from actual choices, but one may
also come across preference information through introspection (for one's
own preferences) or communication (asking others about their desires).5 8 A
second criticism is that reliance upon actual choices may be especially
problematic where it is used most-in market contexts-where choices are
often constrained by the ability to pay.59 For example, an economist would be
hard pressed, in analyzing our purchase decisions, to come up with much
54. See id. at 640-41; Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1553-55, 1557-58 (1998).
55. See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 21, 431 (2002).
56. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Poliy, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 4, 4-5
(1994).
57. See id. at 4-6. Hovenkamp argues that discovering preferences is so problematic that it
can never be correctly described as objective. Id. at 6.
58. See Lee, supra note 21, at 580-82; Amartya K. Sen, RationalFools: A Critique ofthe Behavioral
Foundations ofEconomic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 339-40 (1977).
59. Willingness to pay, as measured by actual choices, is a function of both utility and budget
constraint. Steve isn't willing to pay a million dollars to see his children thrive, not
because he wouldn't pay anything to see them do well but because he does not have the
million dollars to spend. See Hovenkamp, supra note 56, at 13; Thomas F. Cotter, Legal
Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2127 (1996).
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information about our very real desires for front-row seats to all Kansas
basketball games.6 0
These criticisms of revealed preference undermine any analytic link
between choice and preference, and have been subject to discussion
elsewhere. 61 Our critique, however, is more fundamental. Regardless of the
source of our information about the preferences that sustain efficiency claims,
we maintain that those preferences are ill-suited to fill the normative role
assigned to the Pareto principle. No pattern of actual preference satisfaction
is sufficient to establish any welfare claim.
B. Efficiency is Normatively Irrelevant
The problem with the Pareto principle is that it relies on the controversial
UWG claim.62 Economists routinely identify welfare with utility (and so
ultimately with preference satisfaction).63 This is especially true of law and
economics scholars and their corporate law disciples. Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell, for example, have touted the superiority of a welfare or well-
being approach in evaluating the effect of legal rules. 64 They explicitly define
welfare in terms of utility and expected utility, which incorporates everything
that one may find valuable (or distasteful).65 They straightforwardly rely on
preferences as revealed by behavior to identify those wants (and aversions). 66
Their central thesis is that their welfare-based approach is superior to one in
which notions of fairness drive our assessment of legal rules.67
60. See Gary Bedore, KU Sells Courtside Basketball Seats for $15,000 Each, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-
WoRLD, Aug. 21, 2009, at 1.
61. See, e.g., Daniel M. Hausman, Revealed Preference, Belief and Game Theory, 16 EcoN. & PHIL.
99 (2000).
62. Recall that the Unambiguous Welfare Gain claim is that the existence of a Pareto
improvement implies that there is welfare gain for someone without a decrease in
anyone's welfare. The accompanying claim of Minimal Benevolence is comparatively
weak: it asserts only that well-being is one dimension of value. This is generally
recognized as a reasonable view, so we won't discuss it here.
63. See, e.g., Koszegi & Rabin, supra note 20, at 1821, 1823-24; Julianne Nelson, Business
Ethics in a Competitive Market, 13 J. Bus. ETHICS 663, 663-64 (1994); Sugden, supra note
21, at 507. There is a Libertarian argument for market exchange, but it isn't based on the
value of facilitating preference satisfaction. Voluntary trades are supposed to be good
because they respect freedom, whether or not they enhance welfare. See Walter E.
Williams, The Argumentfor Free Markets: Moraity vs. Efficiengy, 15 CAToJ. 179, 182 (1996).
64. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967
(2001), reprinted in KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 55, at 3.
65. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 55, at 18.
66. See id. at 409.
67. See id. at 3-4.
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Although Kaplow and Shavell define welfare by way of preference
satisfaction, they acknowledge that there are "possible differences" between
individual preference and "true well-being." 68  This gap is, of course,
important, and the success of their normative claim rides on their ability to
bridge it. But when it comes to so-called "objectionable" preferences, they
end up admitting that, under their approach, there is no basis for ignoring
them or, indeed, even defining them. 69 Instead, they tend to limit the category
of such preferences, spending a fair amount of time on the preferences of
rapists, bigots, and sadists, which allows them to dodge the issue by arguing
that such preferences are rare enough that they will most often be outweighed
in the utility calculus and thus will not lead to laws that allow their
satisfaction.70 When it comes to cognitive shortcomings, they make a similar
fudge, explaining that when individuals do not fully understand what is good
for them, one may use their "actual well-being"-what they would prefer if
they correctly understood how they were affected.7' Of course, there is little
explanation how one, relying upon revealed preferences, is to get this
information.72
Corporate law scholars further muddle up this issue. Stephen Bainbridge,
for example, just skips preferences and defines Pareto improvements in terms
of well-being. He holds that x is a Pareto improvement over some y just in
case x makes at least one person better off than she would be aty without
making anyone worse off than they would be at y.73  He leaves out
preferences, however, not because he thinks there is reason to doubt that
satisfying a person's preferences will make her better off. Instead, he seems
to so closely identify preference satisfaction with well-being that he feels
comfortable conflating the two. As a result, Bainbridge's "better off'
formulation isn't a version of the economic notion of Pareto improvement at
all.74
Economists and corporate law scholars, then, regularly equate well-being
with preference satisfaction. We should be unwilling to follow suit. The
clearest illustrations of how preference and well-being come apart involve
appeal to moral and prudential intuitions. Rachel, for example, lost
everything she ever loved to her methamphetamine addiction. To hold that
she was better off in some way for fulfilling her desire for meth doesn't make
sense-preferring a pleasant stupor to a (quite satisfactory) family life was an
68. See id. at 4 n.4, 12-13.
69. See id. at 421-26.
70. See id. at 427.
71. See id. at 23.
72. See id. at 410-13.
73. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 58.
74. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 64-65.
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error for Rachel. A moment's reflection suggests that people often want
things that are not good for them: inexperienced drivers want vehicles they
can't handle; the overconfident want to avoid correction; the self-loathing
want to be inappropriately punished; the bigot desires to avoid those she sees
as inferior. When someone gets what she wants in such cases it doesn't count
as any sort of welfare gain because the desires satisfied are just inappropriate
or mistaken.75
At a practical level, it is inevitable that people will want things that don't
enhance their welfare. People make mistakes in forming preferences, even
when they reason from their own views about welfare. And, importantly,
satisfying mistaken preferences won't be conducive to an agent's well-being
even by her own kights.
In the most prosaic (and common) cases, people have false beliefs that
lead them to want one thing when it would make sense for them to want
another. Steve might, for example, desire money and so come to want shares
in CompuGlobalHyperMegaNet (CGHMN) because he believes (erroneously,
it turns out) that an investment in CGHMN will make money.76  Steve's
proximate desire for shares of CGIMN does not track his more basic desire
for money and so satisfying his desire for shares doesn't make him better off
by his own view.77 It follows, then, that erroneous beliefs can give rise to
Pareto improvements where at least one person will actually be worse off by
her own lights. Someone must be selling shares of CGHIN if Steve is able
to buy them. A transaction between them might well be a Pareto
improvement: Steve wants to buy, the seller wants to sell, and no one else
really cares. In general (e.g., special circumstances and portfolio effects aside),
people prefer to buy shares when they think their value will go up and sell
when they think their value will go down. No matter what happens to
CGHMN stock, one of the parties will fail to achieve their ends: if the price
goes down, Steve will regret his purchase; if the price goes up, the seller will
regret the sale. Both want to make the transaction but one will fail to get
what he or she really wants.78 This sort of possibility shows that Pareto
improvements wouldn't guarantee welfare gains even if what people sought
were actually good.
False beliefs aren't the only source of mistaken preferences. Psychology
tells us that people have other trouble bridging the gap between their
75. See Chang, supra note 18, at 179; Sen (1976), supra note 18, at 220-23, 225-26, 229-32;
Thomas Scanlon, Preferences and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655-65 (1975).
76. Most of our desires are derived from more basic desires and beliefs in this way.
77. Actually getting money might not be what it is cracked up to be either. It is possible for
someone to end up where she ought to be by failing to get what she wants.
78. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 124, 137-38; Amartya Sen, Minimalliberty,
59 ECONOMICA, 139, 143-44 (1992).
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overarching goals and the situation-specific preferences that guide their
behavior: they have a hard time resisting nearer but lesser goods, overweight
the influence of small probabilities, are too risk-averse for possible gains, and
are too willing to gamble in order to avoid even trivial losses.79 People are
sometimes attracted to things in an irrational way: they find forbidden fruit
more appealing, suffer from sour-grapes reasoning, or fall prey to group-
think.o People often form beliefs, desires, and preferences without attending
to all of the elements of the situations they consider important.8' Reasoning
goes awry in many ways, so on any account of the good it is practically certain
that people will desire things that are not beneficial on their own view of the
good.82 These sorts of possibilities show that Pareto improvements would
not guarantee welfare gains even if people were ultimately motivated to
achieve what is actually good.83 Given the many ways in which actual
preferences can be based on mistakes, it is a poor idea to read welfare
conclusions off of the mere existence of Pareto improvements.
The point of the preference-versus-welfare criticism is not merely that
utility is imperfectly correlated with well being. The real lesson, rather, is that
every account of the good must distinguish what someone thinks is good from
what is good. A person's preferences capture what she thinks is good, or at
least what she thinks is worth doing.84 Welfare, on the other hand, is
79. For an overview, see Cohn Camerer, Behavioral Economics: Reunfying Psychology and Economics,
96:19 PROCEEDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 10575-77 (1999); Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great
Rationality Debate, 13 PSYCH. ScI. 94, 94-97 (2002).
80. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 128-29.
81. See FREDERIC SCHICK, UNDERSTANDING ACTION 55-88 (1991); Stephen Ellis, Market
Hegemony and Economic Theory, 38 PHIL Soc. SCI. 513, 522-29 (2008); Hayden & Ellis, supra
note 51, at 629, 661-75. I might, for example, form the intention to go for a cup of
coffee with a colleague without attending to either a previously scheduled engagement or
my recently diagnosed ulcer. Even important values will not influence a person's action-
guiding preferences where those values aren't activated.
82. See Sen (1976), supra note 18, at 220-26, 232. This is why there is a standard distinction
between manifest (revealed) preferences and true (normative) preferences. See John
Beshears et al., How Are Preferences Revealed?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1787, 1787 (2008); Chang,
supra note 18, at 193; Rescher, supra note 18, at 176-77. A person is motivated to act by
her manifest preferences, but those preferences may not track what she ultimately wants.
This also explains the appeal of laundered or amended preferences in normative analyses.
See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 128-29; Chang, supra note 18, at 183.
83. This is one reason why Kaplow and Shavell's appeal to what people would prefer under
full information, see KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 55, at 16, doesn't help their view.
Even when people can formulate a view of the good (e.g., they can see what they would
prefer if they knew more), they can't ensure that their proximate preferences track that
view.
84. This shows that preference satisfaction and welfare are connected after a fashion, albeit
not in a way that helps the Pareto principle. This is also why (even though they are not
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concerned with what is actually good, or at least part of the good. No one
who reflects on the difference between thought to be good and good can
understand satisfying even her own preferences (i.e., doing what she thinks is
good) as simply equivalent to doing what is good because people are prone to
mistakes-there is always a conceptual gap. Investigating what people want is
simply distinct from investigating well-being. Appealing to the Pareto
principle to make welfare assessments is sort of like taking a poll to find the
answer to a math problem. In both cases you learn what people think, but
the method itself can't determine whether they have the correct answer. The
conceptual distance between good and thought to be good implies that preference
satisfaction isn't even a satisfactory indicator of welfare. We can't reach
welfare conclusions from on preference-satisfaction evidence where a person
is wrong about what is good or worthy of choice. Intuitions may diverge
about exactly how likely such cases are, but we must have an independent
examination of what is good for people, and so what they should want, to
determine which intuitions are more accurate. If we had information about
what was good for someone, of course, we wouldn't care about the status of
her proximate preferences in the first place. As with the math problem
analogue, there isn't much point in taking a poll once you've done the
calculations carefully.85 Mere preference, then, has no real role to play in
normative assessment.
The foregoing criticism of UWG, that preference satisfaction is not well-
being, is quite persuasive. Despite this fact, most economists still rely on the
Pareto principle and most philosophers seem willing to let them. Defenders
of the Pareto principle respond to the critique in two different ways. The first
attacks the argument itself as depending on controversial premises. The
second response holds that while UWG is, strictly speaking, false, it is
approximately true: the existence of a Pareto improvement is prima facie
evidence that someone has experienced a welfare gain without anyone's
welfare being decreased.86
With regard to the first response, some defenders of the Pareto principle
hold that any distinction between welfare and preference satisfaction must
depend on a controversial view of the good.87 A critic, it seems, must go
outside of an agent's view of the good to argue that she desires something
interdefinable) utility is connected to choice in descriptive economics-it captures what
people see as worthy of choice on the whole.
85. This is not to say that there is no reason to have people check your reasoning, especially if
it is complex. The point, rather, is that the reasoning is the focus, not simply the end
result.
86. As we saw before, some supporters of the Pareto principle overlook its dependence on
UWG and so they fail to even register the criticism.
87. See SEN (1985), supra note 18, at 10; Rescher, supra note 18, at 175-77.
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that is not beneficial for her: after all, she sees what she wants as worth
pursuing. Arguments across conceptions of the good, however, are
notoriously intractable. There is no agreement about what is good, so
criticisms of preferences are inevitably tendentious. 8 Given disagreements
about morality, it seems best to leave welfare (and other facets of the good) in
the eye of the beholder.89 This view is usually amplified by the claim that it is
not an economist's job to work on moral truths anyway.90As an initial matter,
this defense of UWG based on controversial views of the good involves some
questionable burden shifting. The fact that people disagree about the nature
of the good does not show that a given view about the good is not the right
one. At a minimum, philosophical argument seems to rule out some
conceptions of the good as inadequate (for example, divine command
theories of ethics). And while figuring out ethics may not be a job for
economists, this doesn't imply that economists can ignore philosophical
insights.9'
A number of popular views of the good, some of them quite defensible,
imply that people often want the wrong things. Many religious views of the
good, for instance, hold that people do not generally want good things.
Buddhists have a problem with desire in general-as the Second Noble Truth
has it, suffering is caused by attachment.92 Many Christians think that
Original Sin leads to depraved desires-people pursue things that are actually
bad for themselves. 93 Deontological views of ethics, such as Kantian views,
rule out certain desires as inappropriate. 94 Even views that tie the good
88. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 55, at 426; Rescher, supra note 18, at 175-76.
89. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 119; Gravel, supra note 18, at 164; Sugden,
supra note 21, at 507. There is a more positive case for UWG that involves a contractarian
argument. Contractarians hold that rules are justified if they can command unanimous
consent. Everyone can agree to a Pareto improvement-some (those who prefer it) will
advocate for it, no one will block it (since no one prefers the alternative). See Cudd, supra
note 20, at 7; Sugden, supra note 21, at 507. Everyone would agree to Pareto principle
(and a bit more) behind a veil of ignorance. See Sugden & Weale, supra note 18, at 113. In
this sense, at least, rationality endorses Pareto improvements-they are what rational
people can achieve.
90. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, smpra note 1, at 119-20; Anthony B. Atkinson, The Strange
Disappearance of Welfare Economics, 54 KYKLoS 193, 194-95 (2001).
91. Arguably, economists have already committed to a philosophical position by holding
UWG.
92. SeeJOEL KUPPERMAN, CLASSIC ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 26, 31-35, 40-41 (2d ed. 2007).
93. See MICHAEL C. REA, THE METAPHYSICS OF ORIGINAL SIN, IN PERSONS HUMAN AND
DIVINE 319, 323 (Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman eds., 2007). A less radical take
holds that Original Sin has merely disordered human desires, making right desires
impossible to achieve without divine aid. See id. at 323-24.
94. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 33-36; 4:424-28
(Mary Gregor ed., 1997). According to Kant, "philosophy is to manifest its purity as
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closely to human nature generally hold that it is difficult to determine what
actions and attitudes are appropriate under various circumstances.95 UWG is
inconsistent with these common views of the good. Economists can defend
their usual approach to welfare economics, then, only if they are willing to
enter the debate about the good. They remain unwilling, however, to even
address such philosophical issues.96
Burden of proof issues aside, the controversial-views-of-the-good defense
of UWG is misdirected. As it is drawn above, the distinction between
preference satisfaction and welfare doesn't depend on any particular view of
the good. The criticism of UWG is not that there is one true view of the
good such that people want things that are not in fact good. Rather, it holds
that for any (remotely plausible) conception of the good, even someone who
holds it will prefer some things that are inconsistent with that conception-97
There are a number of reasons why a person's preferences might come apart
not only from what is objectively valuable (if there is such a thing) but also
from her own deepest subjective values.
As we saw before, perfectly normal reasoning can lead people to actually
want things they wouldn't want if they knew the facts. People have false
beliefs, sometimes due to poor information and sometimes due to poor (for
example, non-Bayesian) information processing." Likewise, the psychological
evidence tells us that there will always be a gap between agents' values and
their behavior-guiding preferences. People don't, and as a practical matter
can't, evaluate specific situations in a way that is fully consistent with even
their own considered views of the good. The preference-satisfaction-is-not-
well-being criticism of UWG doesn't depend on any particular view of the
good, much less a controversial one.
sustainer of its own laws . . . that they expect nothing from the inclination of human
beings but everything from the supremacy of the law and the respect owed it or, failing
this, condemn the human being to contempt for himself and inner abhorrence." Id. at 35;
4:425-26.
95. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 64-65; 1113al5-1113b2 (Terence Irwin ed.,
1985); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 14-15 (13th ed. 1906).
96. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, sura note 1, at 67, 119-20; Rescher, supa note 18, at 176.
97. To some, this might evoke the debate between objective and subjective views of the good.
Our argument, however, doesn't hinge on that discussion. It probably would be easier to
make the case that people sometimes want harmful things if "there [were] things that are
good in themselves for an individual independently of her desires and attitudes toward
them[.]" Richard J. Arneson, Perfectionism andPoliics, 111 ETHICS 37, 37 (2000). Still, it is
possible to reason poorly about the good and so have misguided preferences even if "the
things that are intrinsically good for an agent ... acquire this status only in virtue of how
she happens to regard them[.]" Id.
98. See Koszegi & Rabin, supra note 20, at 1827-28.
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The mitigation response to the criticism that preference satisfaction isn't
the same as well-being maintains that although the connections among
choices, preferences, and welfare aren't certain, they are close enough to
validate most economic claims. UWG, then, is approximately true: the
existence of a Pareto improvement is prima facie evidence that someone has
experienced a welfare gain without anyone's welfare being decreased. Koszegi
and Rabin's recent paper, "Choices, Situations, and Happiness," is a prime
example of this approach.99 Koszegi and Rabin note that on the traditional
economic approach, "observed behavior is assumed to reflect fully rational
maximization of utility, and. . . welfare is higher in one situation than another
if it lets a person attain the outcome she seems most inclined to choose." 00
They acknowledge, however, that this account has conceptual deficiencies.
Preferences, for instance, are more complicated than is usually assumed.
Someone might prefer to have help quitting smoking, other things being
equal, but prefer to pass up an opportunity to receive aid because she hates to
ask for it.101 Koszegi and Rabin are primarily interested in drawing a
methodological lesson here: choice behavior alone cannot isolate complex
preferences of this sort.102 A pattern of choices can't, for example, exclude
the possibility that someone would get more utility from a painful,
unavoidable death than anything she actually chooses over death-she
chooses only with respect to avoidable deaths and so we have no basis for
assessing her preference for unavoidable ones. 103 Common sense suggests, of
course, that people don't want to suffer a painful, unavoidable death and this
is good enough to exclude a preference for such outcomes. In order to fix
preferences, then, choice evidence must be supplemented with some ancillary
assumptions. Koszegi and Rabin admit that economics always relies on such
choice-unobservable principles.104
Like the critics of UWG, Koszegi and Rabin also allow that people make
mistakes in the pursuit of their ends: for example, they misunderstand the
stock market, commit the gambler's fallacy, or make other cognitive errors.105
They are focused on a methodological lesson here as well: choices aren't
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1821.
101. See id. at 1821-24. Preferences of this sort violate what Koszegi and Rabin call "Menu
Independence of Welfare." Id. at 1824.
102. See id. at 1823-27. Different sets of preferences lead to the same sorts of choices (for
example, people continue to smoke for different reasons) so no set of behavioral
observations can, by itself, tease out which preferences are operative.
103. See id. at 1823.
104. See id. at 1821, 1823. They see a role for psychology in uncovering new, perhaps less
common sense, assumptions of this sort. See id. at 1827, 1830-31.
105. See id at 1827-28.
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always good evidence for a person's preferences because her actions might
express her mistakes rather than her desires.106 The take-home message,
again, is that we can't just read a person's utility off her behavior without
consulting psychological evidence and assumptions. 07
Despite its problems, Koszegi and Rabin think the standard economic
approach to welfare is on the right track: "[w]hen doing so with sensible
ancillary assumptions, inferring people's well-being based on the presumption
that observed choices are rational is in our view the best scientific program
for studying well-being yet formulated." 08 In particular, they stand by the
substantive conclusions of standard welfare economics:
Despite conceptual problems . . . in many cases it seems clear
that both rationality and choice-set independence of preferences
are good enough approximations that in fact familiar approaches
are quite sufficient. . . . [R]evealed preference is too powerful a
tool for studying well-being, and the ancillary assumptions
needed to render the tool effective are often too minimal and
reasonable, to fret much about the conclusions economists are
reaching except in cases where there are specific reasons to
doubt these assumptions.109
Despite their shortcomings, then, the connection between choices and
preferences is good enough to support the normative conclusions of
economic reasoning.
Even critics of the Pareto principle accept something like the foregoing
mitigation line. Hausman and McPherson, for example, make the case that
"[t]here are problems with endorsing all Pareto improvements (as the Pareto
principle does) ... ."110 Still, they hold that "[t]he Pareto principle has some
real ethical appeal because satisfying preferences surely has something to do
with promoting well-being.""' Sen, likewise, emphasizes "the unacceptability
of the Pareto principle as a universal rule."11 2 Nonetheless, he holds that
"there is something very central in the idea that preferences unanimously held
106. See id. at 1828-29.
107. Investigating mistakes provides another potential role for psychology within the general
economic framework.
108. Koszegi & Rabin, supra note 20, at 1821. While Koszegi and Rabin "make the case for
supplementing and combining" the traditional approach with psychological research, they
are primarily interested in patching conceptual cracks. Id. at 1821.
109. Id. at 1823.
110. HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 137.
111. Id. at 138.
112. Sen (1976), supra note 18, at 235.
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by members of a community cannot be rejected by that community. As Blau.
. . puts it, 'I can see no case for an outside observer denying a unanimous
choice."'113
Standard welfare economics treats choices (or at least the instrumentally
rational ones) as welfare maximizing.114 The mitigation response to the
criticism of the Pareto principle, while it allows that choice and welfare can
come apart, argues that the connection is still good enough to be useful. It is
important to recognize, however, that the Pareto principle relies upon the
connection between choice and welfare. Under the standard view, that
connection involves two steps: the first equates choice with preference
satisfaction and the second preference satisfaction with welfare. The
mitigation response is primarily concerned with examining and ultimately
defending the first step, but such moves shed little light on the validity of the
second, which is crucial to the Pareto principle (and the focus of this essay).
Mitigationists such as Koszegi and Rabin are a perfect, recent example of
this. While they reject "the debilitating tautology that everything people do
maximizes their utility,"115 they still accept the even more problematic view
that well-being is a matter of utility maximization. Koszegi and Rabin, for
example, only argue for the claim that behavior, supplemented by
psychological assumptions, allows us to characterize preferences. The view
that "rationality and choice-set independence of preferences are good enough
approximations" only supports the claim that we can read preferences off
behavior, yet they conclude that looking at preferences "is too powerful a tool
for studying well-being."11 6 They just take it for granted that there is a close
connection between utility and welfare. Much the same point holds for
Hausman and McPherson, as well as for Sen. While they recognize that they
are concerned specifically with preferences on the one hand and welfare on
the other, they simply appeal to their intuitions that there must be something
that connects preference satisfaction and well-being.
Appeal to the popular views of the good canvassed above should be
enough to cast at least some doubt on any intuition linking welfare and
preference satisfaction. If the Second Noble Truth (or a Christian account of
113. Id. at 235-36. Sen rejects the Pareto principle in favor of "a conditonal version .... If
everyone in a community prefers x toy and wants that preference to count, then x must
be socially preferred toy (conditional weak Pareto principleD] . . ." Id. at 236. Sen also
discusses a conditional version of the strong Pareto principle. Id. at 243. Conditionalizing
the Pareto principle in this way doesn't help with the objection we are pressing. Sen
wants to salvage the intuition that no outside observers can question a unanimous choice;
this is exactly the intuition we argue is unsupported.
114. Koszegi & Rabin, supra note 20, at 1821.
115. Id. at 1822.
116. Id. at 1823.
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original sin or Kant's categorical imperative, etc.) were correct then the
"ancillary assumptions" to which Koszegi and Rabin appeal, "minimal and
reasonable" though they might be, wouldn't be enough to vouchsafe "the
conclusions economists are reaching" about the welfare properties of Pareto
improvements." 7 The intuition that preference satisfaction has something to
with welfare must be sensitive to the debate about the good. Mere appeal to
the existence of Pareto improvements cannot answer any normative
questions.
More importantly, any intuition that actual, situation-specific preferences
(as opposed to broader value commitments) at least approximate the good
must yield when we recall the way in which welfare and utility come apart. As
we saw before, poor reasoning (in its many forms) will lead everyone to have
desires that don't make sense given their more fundamental values. Whatever
conception of the good someone might hold, she can (and, as a practical
matter, will) want something inconsistent with that conception. In order to
separate mistaken from value-congruent preferences, we need to be explicit
about the value standard at issue and use it to evaluate preferences. This,
however, is exactly what standard normative economics tries to avoid-the
Pareto principle is supposed to allow us to determine when we have a welfare
gain without any need to look at the value judgments that preferences are
based upon. Once the value standards are required, there isn't much point in
consulting preference satisfaction-we can look directly at whether behavior
advances the relevant values. Again, taking a poll might provide correct
answers to a math problem, but maybe not. The only way to tell is to either
know the answer independently or to closely follow and evaluate the
reasoning process of those polled. Once you have done or are doing the
math, however, the existence of the poll isn't helping you find the answer.
Likewise with the Pareto principle: the mere existence of a Pareto
improvement doesn't tell us about welfare; we need to look at the appropriate
values for that.118
117. Id.
118. The contractarian case for UWG is undermined by the same point. Contractarianism
assumes that people will agree to what they should. Even contractual views allow that
people can misunderstand or misforecast value assessments. See Cudd, supra note 20, at
26; Sugden & Weale, supra note 18, at 119. The normative force of a social contract
depends on avoiding such errors. Even contractarians, then, must distinguish between
deals that people would actually make and deals they should make (by way of constraints
such as the original position). See Sugden & Weale, supra note 18, at 111, 113. Absent
such a distinction, a contract is, at best, a modus vivendi. Political sustainability is important,
of course, but it is a different issue than morality. See Atkinson, supra note 90, at 197, 199.
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IV. WHITHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
The Pareto principle is false because the existence of a Pareto
improvement does not imply a welfare gain for anyone. The problem isn't
merely that Pareto improvements do not guarantee well-being on many views
of the good. Rather, no view of the good allows someone to draw
conclusions about welfare (or any other facet of the good) from the existence
of a Pareto improvement (or any other pattern of preference satisfaction). As
a normative claim, the Pareto principle is worthless because it looks at the
wrong thing.
There are some obvious practical benefits to unanimous consent,
especially in the political realm.119 Politics is the art of the possible so it is
important to identify a consensus-based starting point for normative
assessment. We are willing to allow, then, that trying to achieve Pareto
improvements might generally be a wise policy, despite the fact that the
Pareto principle isn't true. Still, getting agreement is, at most, a modus vivendi,
not a stopping point. Economists are therefore mistaken when they assert
that "economic research and teaching does now (via our various notions of
efficiency and welfare) reach strong conclusions about well-being."1 20 What,
then, is the appropriate role for economics in the study of welfare?
Economists, as such, have no particular insight about what makes people
better or worse off. Even without its own characterization of well-being,
however, economic analysis can still help us understand features of the world
that have been independently identified as relevant to well-being.121
Economics, for example, is the primary tool we have for studying the
distribution of food, shelter, security, and comfort items in a given society.
While the connection is not straightforward, the distribution of such goods is
(quite plausibly) a crucial determinant of human welfare. Economics has an
important role to play in the study of well-being but it is no part of that role
to determine what counts as welfare.
Arguments based on economic efficiency, however, are often used to
counter proposals for restructuring corporate law. Kent Greenfield, for
example, has long championed a variety of progressive corporate reforms.1 22
He generally advocates moving away from the model of shareholder primacy
by allowing firms to straightforwardly account for the effect of their decisions
119. It might even be that agreement on a course of action has some evidentiary value-there
may be something to folk beliefs about the "wisdom of the crowd" and "crowdsourcing."
120. Koszegi & Rabin, supra note 20, at 1831.
121. See HAUSIVIAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 1, at 129-33.
122. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAws
AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 123-24 (2007); Kent Greenfield & D. Gordon Smith,
Debate: Saving the World with Coporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947, 952, 975 (2008).
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on society at large.123 More specifically, he argues in favor of changing the
composition of the board of directors to include representatives of other
corporate stakeholders such as employees, customers, creditors, and the
community.124 In Greenfield's view, these reform proposals would shift the
focus of corporations away from the aggregation of shareholder profit in
favor of promoting other social values.
These proposals are often countered with simple appeals to their
purported inefficiency. D. Gordon Smith, for example, recently argued
against many of Greenfield's proposals by noting that they might come at the
expense of shareholder utility.12 5 Any move toward Greenfield's goals that
materially changed the content of corporate decisions would "sacrifice
potential shareholder value in favor of value for non-shareholder
constituencies" and thus "destroy much of the good that corporations have
done."126 While Smith allows that corporations might "enhance employee
welfare, make the environment cleaner, or improve human rights throughout
the world," they should do so only when they can act "without impairing
shareholder value."127
Importantly, Smith doesn't counter these proposals on their own terms.
Instead, he is content to point out, "[1]ike other would-be reformers,
Professor Greenfield runs smack into Adam Smith's invisible hand."128 To be
fair, Greenfield, like Blair and Stout discussed above, also structures his
arguments largely on the basis of preference-based efficiency claims-he
views his reform proposals to be superior because they take more direct
account of the preferences of all stakeholders rather than just the
shareholders. (Indeed, he is complimented for "cleverly" turning economic
analysis against its practitioners.)129 Smith then counters those proposals with
a claim that shareholders may not prefer them-any move away from status
quo is viewed with suspicion because it could not be a Pareto improvement.130
These simple appeals to the descriptive efficiency (or inefficiency) of
corporate law masquerade as normative argument and, in the end, mean that
neither side fully engages with the real issues.
A quick survey of the scholarship turns up many similar arguments with
respect to current and proposed changes in corporate law. The Sarbanes-
123. See Greenfield & Smith, supra note 122, at 965.
124. See id. at 980.
125. See D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 985,
1009-10 (2008).
126. Id. at 1010.
127. Id. at 1008.
128. Id. at 995.
129. Id. at 995 n.64.
130. See id. at 1008-10.
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Oxley Act and its provision of independent audit committees is criticized for
failing to improve corporate financial performance.131 Proposed reforms that
target excessive executive compensation are defended on the grounds that no
corporate constituents, including shareholders, have anything to complain
about because they all received the benefit of their real or "hypothetical"
bargains.132  This species of argumentation really thrives against the
background view of the corporation as a nexus of contracts. If the proposal
were an improvement, then people would have already agreed to it; they
haven't, therefore it's a bad proposal. Whether applied to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, Say-on-Pay, or other broader corporate reforms of the sort advocated by
Greenfield, the debates assume a Panglossian view of corporate affairs in
which the mere existence of a particular feature of corporate governance is
the ultimate argument for its continuation.
CONCLUSION
The primary upshot of this paper is methodological. Debate about
corporate structure has been effectively short circuited by appeals to
considerations of allocative efficiency. There is nothing wrong with treating
the standard structures of corporate governance as a descriptive base-line.
But the (purported) efficiency of such structures provides them with no
normative presumption whatsoever. If someone were to give a compelling
moral argument that corporate decision-makers should abide by certain rules
or take into account certain interests that they currently don't, it adds nothing
to the debate to merely point to inefficiencies that would be introduced. It is
important to know the results of any changes in corporate governance, of
course, and such results may well affect the argument that supports such
changes. It is important to note, however, that the consequences of
interfering with even voluntary transactions are not self-evaluating: we need to
appeal to normative arguments before we can draw any conclusions. Even if
corporations as currently structured are efficient in a descriptive sense, that is
no barrier at all to any normative argument for altering corporate governance.
131. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529-33 (2005).
132. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN
9-10 (2008).
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